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1. Introduction 
The RFID technology is already of high commercial relevance. It breaks into new application 
areas, and new markets are emerging. RFID becomes more and more an indispensable part 
of our everyday life. However, the technology also introduces security and privacy 
problems. Despite of the numerous research efforts, no satisfactory solutions for these issues 
have yet been found and widely implemented. For this reason, there are many people who 
take fright at RFID. 
Today’s RFID system architecture is carried over from the architecture used in other auto-id 
systems, chiefly optical barcode systems. As RFID introduces new functionalities and 
privacy risks, this classic architecture is no longer appropriate. For instance, the classic 
architecture fails to provide location privacy and self-determination for the affected users 
while being scalable and open. In this chapter, the problem is explained, the limitations in 
extending the classic architecture are outlined, and important aspects of a new architecture 
are sketched. 
In the remainder of this first subchapter, an overview of the security and privacy goals and 
the main concepts for reaching them is provided. The requirements that RFID systems 
should fulfill are outlined in a separate section. The second subchapter introduces into the 
current RFID system architecture and the general direction of RFID security and privacy 
research. Subchapter 3 shows the practical deficiencies of the current architecture and 
illustrates, using an example, why incremental improvements and extensions lack to 
provide satisfactory solutions. Finally, considerations on how a completely new RFID 
architecture might look like are performed. 
1.1 Security and privacy goals 
There are five high-level issues of great importance for the RFID system security and the 
users’ privacy [Henrici, D. (2008)]. Fig. 1 shows an overview on them. The remainder of this 
section provides a more detailed explanation of each goal.  
Maintain data security: In many cases, RFID systems operate with privacy sensitive data that 
shall not become public. Such data may be some product information or even personal 
information. Security mechanisms for the prevention of illegal access to such data are one of 
the main challenges for RFID systems. 
Prevent counterfeiting: With the change-over from barcodes to RFID, a better prevention of 
product counterfeiting is desired. Plagiarism in not only an economic issue but, e.g. in the 
case of drugs, can also be a mortal danger.  O
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Fig. 1.  Security and privacy goals for RFID systems [Henrici, D. (2008)] 
Prevent illegitimate access: Reading an RFID tag, a reader creates a “read event” that is 
processed in the backend systems. It should be ensured that valid events cannot be 
generated by spoofed devices. This prevents, for example, that an attacker can fabricate 
events indicating a false location of an RFID tag. In general, illegitimate access to system 
components shall be effectively prevented. 
Cope with denial of service: It is easy to put parts of an RFID system out of order. The reading 
of many kinds of RFID tags can be interfered with tinfoil, for example. Since a prevention of 
all denial of service attacks is not feasible, RFID systems should at least provide means for 
detection and recovery. RFID protocols should not introduce additional denial of service 
vulnerabilities. 
Prevent unwanted recognition and tracking:  Recognition and tracking of objects belong to the 
main purposes of RFID systems. Logistics applications rely on such functionality. However, 
from a privacy perspective, this is not always desired, especially when persons are involved. 
For this reason, a mechanism that allows people to decide when their RFID tags can be used 
for recognition/tracking and by whom is reasonable. 
1.2 Reaching the security and privacy goals 
In the previous section, five high-level security and privacy goals were introduced. This 
section explains the general approaches for reaching them. 
Maintain data security: Data can be stored directly on RFID tags or in databases in backend 
systems. For achieving data security, it makes sense to store as few data as possible directly 
on tags. This means that an RFID tag should contain just a unique identifier which acts as a 
reference to other data stored in backend systems. 
This approach offers many advantages. The RFID tags need little storage which keeps their 
cost low. Furthermore, potentially privacy sensitive data are not transferred between tags 
and readers on an insecure medium, and costly measures for protecting these data are not 
required. Instead, secure and flexible access control methods can be applied for accessing 
the data in the backend. There are also some other advantages like flexibility, 
interoperability, and increased speed of reading. Due to all the advantages, storing only 
identifiers directly on the tags and all other data in backend systems is the approach used in 
most RFID research. We assume the approach as basis in the following. 
Prevent counterfeiting: Using the “track & trace” approach, it is possible to implement 
plausibility checks. By keeping a detailed object history and by storing the intended 
movement of items, it is possible to detect unexpected object locations that indicate fraud. 
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However, keeping such an object history requires a dense network of readers and standards 
for data exchange. Using “track & trace” with its extensive product history is also add odds 
with privacy requirements and does not allow for “real” security. 
For preventing counterfeiting effectively without requiring such an extensive data 
collection, an authentication mechanism is an inevitable requirement. The authenticity of 
RFID tags should become verifiable to prevent tag cloning. 
Prevent illegitimate access: Also for achieving this goal, the authentication ability of RFID tags 
is essential. If only data of authenticated tags is processed, attackers cannot enter invalid 
data into the RFID system. Note that there is a class of attacks called “relay attacks” [Kfir, Z. 
& Wool, A. (2005)] that cannot be prevented by tag authentication alone. Considerations 
regarding this class of attacks are beyond the scope of this text. 
Cope with denial of service: Denial of service attacks cannot be fully prevented in practice. For 
instance, tags can be permanently destroyed by mechanical, chemical or electromagnetic 
means. Temporary denial of service can be performed by shielding the tags or transmitting 
disturbing noise. One can only try to implement mechanisms to detect such actions, provide 
means for sanctioning, and implement processes for recovery. For security and privacy 
researchers who implement new concepts and protocols for RFID communication, it is 
important that no additional means for denial of service attacks are introduced with the new 
solutions. 
Prevent unwanted recognition and tracking: It is important that outsiders, i.e. potentially 
unwanted readers, are not able to abuse the data stored on RFID tags for unwanted 
recognition and tracking. Arbitrary static data, e.g. an identifier or even encrypted data, acts 
as a means for recognition and tracking. Even constellations of tags with different amounts 
of data can be used for tracking purposes. 
For preventing unwanted recognition and tracking, no static data may be stored on tags. 
This means that a periodic change of the tag identifiers is required. The idea behind this 
concept is that only authorized parties can link the changing identifiers to the tag identity 
and the data stored in backend systems. Illegitimate parties can no longer distinguish 
whether two tag identifiers obtained at different times belong to the same tag or not. 
Altogether, for reaching the five presented goals, three core functionalities are required for 
RFID tags: (unique) identification, authentication, and modification (regular changes of tag 
identifiers). As important constraint, implementing these functionalities should not 
introduce additional possibilities for denial of service attacks. Identification is the basic 
functionality required for RFID systems to operate. Authentication mechanisms prevents tag 
cloning (and therewith counterfeiting) and illegitimate access. Modification, i.e. a regular 
change of the tag identifiers, prevents unwanted recognition and tracking. RFID researchers 
implement these functionalities in different ways and propose various schemes. 
1.3 Solution requirements 
In addition to fulfilling functional requirements, RFID systems should fulfill many non-
functional criteria, i.e. provide quality or have certain qualities. This section defines a set of 
requirements that can be used for the evaluation of an RFID system and its core 
components. The requirements are mostly also usable for evaluating RFID communication 
protocols. 
Security and Privacy: The importance of security and privacy for RFID systems and the 
complexity of their achievement have been discussed at the beginning of the chapter. The 
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previous section presented the properties a system should have in order to fulfill these 
requirements. 
Resources: Since the amount of resources needed for the realization of RFID solutions have 
an effect on the costs, it is important to keep the required resources as low as possible. The 
cost factor determines the economic incentive of the technology. As RFID tags have to be 
produced in oodles to be applied on everyday objects, the tag cost and therewith the 
available tag resources are the most limiting aspects. 
Performance: The performance of RFID systems can be measured on the time needed to read 
a bunch of tags, i.e. to get all the relevant data. The result depends on many factors like the 
bandwidth of the physical communication channel, the amount of data to be transferred, the 
number of message roundtrips, the time for retrieving data from backend systems, the use 
of caching mechanisms, etc. Performance can be improved by keeping message size and 
number of messages small and by using caching and delegation mechanisms. 
Scalability: This is an important quality for systems intended for inter-organizational or even 
worldwide use. The design of a system has to allow in best case an unlimited extension of 
users, data, and devices. There should not be any bottlenecks in the system. In practice, this 
requirement is fulfilled by distributing load without requiring central systems for control. 
Reliability and availability: RFID systems often become part of business processes. Like with 
most information systems, companies and people start to rely on the operation of the 
technology. Failures and errors disturb business process and can thus become very costly. 
Therefore, RFID systems should always be available and operate reliably. 
Usability: RFID systems should be calm, just like any ubiquitous computing system [Weiser, 
M. (1991)]. This means that these systems should not require the user’s attention if possible. 
The RFID systems have to work for the user and ease his everyday life without disturbing or 
bothering him. User interactions should be required as seldom as possible, and the 
technology should not require a special behaviour from the user, e.g. waiting until an 
operation is completed. 
Sustainability: In some application areas, RFID tags have a long life span. For example, RFID 
tags are used to identify university inventory, firm inventory, and library books. This needs 
consideration when implementing mechanisms that rely on cryptographic primitives. What 
is secure today is often no longer secure some years ahead. RFID systems have to keep up 
with the times. This means that new tags should be able to use up to date cryptographic 
primitives while older tags still use less secure ones. 
RFID tags usually implement primitives in hardware that cannot be updated. Replacing 
such tags may be economically infeasible. It should be possible that such tags remain in 
operation. As they use less secure primitives, these primitives might get broken with 
feasible effort at some time. The impact of such a security breach should be as limited as 
possible, e.g. the affected tag should still be identifiable and only lose some privacy features. 
Universality: In order to use RFID tags all over the world and in different applications, the 
tags have to be designed in a generic and application independent manner. Having the same 
kinds of tags reduces costs due to mass production. Having the same level of security and 
privacy protection everywhere relieves the users from the burden to pay attention to the 
level which is implemented with a particular tag. Of course, it should be possible to hold 
arbitrary application specific data in an RFID system and to use different cryptographic 
primitives. This means that a high level of flexibility should be provided with only a small 
number of different kinds of RFID tags. 
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Scope: The scope of RFID application areas varies from local to global and from intra-
organizational to inter-organizational. Ideally, RFID system architectures and therewith 
RFID systems are able to operate on a global, inter-organizational scope. 
Practicability: Many proposals regarding RFID security and privacy are of academic nature. 
Some proposals even only work in theory but inherently fail in practice (e.g. some 
protection schemes require ideal synchronization of data transmissions and/or do not 
consider the behavior of the physical layer). Practicability is thus a crucial requirement. 
Practicability also needs to be considered with respect to the already mentioned usability and 
other requirements: Low costs, fast processing of the data, minimal user involvement, and 
secure handling of data are some of the problems that are, at least indirectly, linked to 
RFID’s practicability. 
2. Current RFID system architecture 
This subchapter describes the common RFID system architecture. It shows that the 
architecture is based on the one known from other kinds of auto-id systems, like optical 
barcode systems. Afterwards, the general direction of security and privacy research is 
outlined. Overall, the subchapter  shows a “mainstream direction” of RFID architecture and 
RFID security and privacy research. 
2.1 Barcode systems as the guide 
A typical barcode system is depicted in figure 2. This example shows the operation of a cash 
register in a retail market. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Barcode system example 
Optical one-dimensional barcodes provide product information via bars with different 
width and space between them. To read the information for a given product, the barcode of 
the product is captured using a barcode reader, sometimes also called “scanner”. In the 
example, the reader is directly connected to the cash register. In a supermarket, the barcode 
contains an identifier for the manufacturer and an identifier for the product type. These 
identifiers do not provide the required information like the product price to the cash 
register. Thus, the scanned information is transferred to the backend of the system. The 
backend has a database with item information and retrieves the database record associated 
with the given barcode data. The database record includes information like a product 
description and the current product price. The product information is then transferred back 
to the cash register. Usually, the backend also keeps a product inventory, i.e. information on 
the number of items available. This information is updated when triggered by the cash 
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register. The cash register now has all required product information to print the customer 
receipt. 
RFID systems have corresponding system components: RFID tags, RFID readers, and 
backend systems. Low-cost passive RFID tags are intended as an alternative to optical 
barcodes: The tags can store a certain amount of data, e.g. 128 bit. For the point-of-sale, the 
data forms an identifier that is structured into manufacturer, product type, and a serial 
number. The serial number part makes the identifier unique. 
Apart from the additional serial number, RFID systems for the point-of-sale are fully 
compatible to barcode systems. The process that has been shown in figure 2 remains the 
same in such cases. Using RFID labels as a replacement for optical barcodes is therefore a 
simple task. Only if additional possibilities that result from the serial number shall be used, 
vendors have to provide new software. 
Based on the similarities between barcode systems and RFID systems, figure 3 shows an 
“Auto-ID Triangle”. The barcode or the RFID tag is the “media” on which some data, i.e. the 
“content”, is stored. The data has a meaning which is defined by numbering schemes. The 
media is read using readers which generate read events that are processed. Such a “data 
processing” can have arbitrary forms. Read data, usually containing an identifier, can be 
linked to additional data that is stored in databases. The mentioned read events can be 
filtered, data can be linked to other data, or whatever else.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Auto-ID Triangle 
Note that RFID tags can have additional functionalities like sensors or smartcard-like 
functionality. Such additional functionality breaks the analogy between barcodes and RFID. 
It is thus not covered by the Auto-ID Triangle in figure 3. 
Interestingly, the major limitations of auto-id systems today are within the backend systems, 
i.e. the data processing. This means that efficiency and productivity could be much higher if 
there were better backend systems. For instance, if products are processed by different 
companies, often each company applies its own barcode to the product instead of using 
already present barcodes. This is often not necessary if the reader and the backend are 
flexible enough. RFID tags or 2D-barcodes with their means for unique identification can 
make reuse much simpler because there is no possibility for identifier collisions any more. 
Data sharing between companies is another aspect with room for improvement. In many 
business processes, there are still many manual steps that could be avoided using 
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appropriate information technology enabling inter-organizational data sharing. For 
instance, if bills had a unique identifier that could be read by an auto-id system, one could 
retrieve payment information automatically instead of entering the required data. 
The Object Name Service (ONS) [EPCglobal (2008)] maps unique identifiers (here: Electronic 
Product Codes, EPCs) to additional data in an application independent manner. It operates 
quite similarly to the domain name system. However, it is only a first building block. For 
flexible and efficient inter-organizational data sharing, a lot more functionality and open 
standards are required. 
2.2 Security and privacy research 
There is an essential difference between barcode systems and RFID systems. RFID systems 
use electromagnetic fields or waves as data transport medium. Since this medium is easy to 
tap, the communication channel between RFID tags and reader needs to be secured (ref. to 
fig. 4). In contrast, the optical channel in barcode systems requires a line-of-sight. A barcode 
on an item in a bag cannot be read, whereas this is possible with RFID tags. 
 
 
Fig. 4. RFID system with vulnerable communication channel 
Research in RFID systems is thus concerned with the definition of communication protocols 
that secure the vulnerable channel between tags and readers. A lot of researchers 
concentrate on methods that not only provide security features but also assure privacy 
protection in RFID systems. 
The achievement of the stated security and privacy goals (see subchapters 1.1 and 1.2) 
requires three basic functionalities. Protocols need to implement identification, 
authentication, and modification. This means that an RFID tag must be able to identify itself, 
to authenticate itself, and to change its identifier regularly. Many researchers propose 
protocols that implement these three basic functionalities in different ways, to a different 
extent, and in different quality. First protocols for RFID communication have been 
presented in 2002 [Sarma et al., (2002)]. However, the research continued in this direction, 
and still today (2008) new communication protocols are introduced on major conferences 
(e.g. [Henrici, D. & Müller P. (2008)]). 
A presentation, comparison, or evaluation of the published approaches can be found, for 
example, in [Lehtonen et al., (2006)] with a focus on authentication and for more  
general approaches in [Avoine, G. (2005)]. Avoine also maintains a website (see 
http://www.avoine.net/rfid/) with links to publications. 
Protocols have to consider the amount of resources consumed by the RFID tags. This 
amount has to be kept as low as possible to assure cost-effective production of a large 
number of tags. For this reason, the implementation of the three functionalities needs to be 
kept as simple as possible. This leads to avoidance of symmetrical and asymmetrical 
cryptographic techniques and the exclusive application of one-way hash functions in many 
proposals. Most requirements stated in subchapter 1.3 also apply for RFID communication 
protocols. 
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3. Reconsidering the current architecture 
The common RFID architecture is based on the one known from barcode systems. 
Extensions are added when required. Researchers are looking for solutions that secure the 
communications channel between tags and readers. Regular identifier changes shall protect 
against unauthorized creation of movement profiles. 
In this subchapter, some major deficiencies of the current architecture are presented. 
Afterwards it is reasoned why extensions to the architecture are not sufficient to address all 
these deficiencies and thus to provide a satisfying solution. 
3.1 Deficiencies of the current architecture 
There are several reasons why the described architecture and the proposed security 
mechanisms are inappropriate for today’s demand. Some important deficiencies are the 
following: 
1. There are no explicit possibilities for infrastructure sharing. 
2. The proposed lightweight security protocols supporting identifier changes are not 
practical. 
3. Most lightweight security protocols do not support delegation. 
4. Tag bearers are not a part of the RFID architecture. 
5. Some solution requirements like sustainability are not considered adequately. 
 
Different parties (companies etc.)
Business applications
and other systems (ERP etc.)
Local data storage
Diefferent AutoID-systems
Basic middleware functionality
(data filtering, data lookup)
 
Fig. 5. Today’s inter-organizational data sharing 
There are no explicit possibilities for infrastructure sharing. 
Each company has to build its own RFID infrastructure, i.e. install its own readers. There is 
no standardized way to make use of readers installed by other companies. 
In practice, if a company wants to obtain read events of subcontractors, e.g. for providing 
item locations to customers in logistics applications, such data sharing needs to be 
implemented on the application layer (see figure 5). Standards for data formats evolve, but 
there are not enough defined interfaces and procedures so that enabling data sharing is a 
costly task. 
The proposed lightweight security protocols supporting identifier changes are not practical. 
For providing location privacy, tag identifiers have to be changed regularly. However, 
frequent identifier changes are difficult to provide without requiring the tags to interact with 
backend systems. Besides the challenge to implement a protocol with good characteristics, 
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regular identifier changes put high load on the infrastructure. Even without such additional 
load, the data produced by RFID events is a burden for networks and the backend systems. 
Most lightweight security protocols do not support delegation. 
Today’s business processes often take place among different companies. This means that 
companies no longer act independently from others but have, for instance, subcontractors 
involved in a business process. Therefore, delegation becomes an important feature (see 
Molnar et al., (2005)). 
To provide location privacy, identifier changes are performed. This means that 
subcontractors can no longer identify a tag without communication with the tag owner. For 
efficiency reasons, the possibility to delegate the ability to identify a tag is required. 
Tag bearers are not a part of the RFID architecture. 
Tag bearers are the users that carry items with RFID tags.  Obviously, the privacy of such 
tag bearers is in danger (data security, location privacy). Nevertheless, the current 
architecture and therewith the RFID protocols do not consider the tag bearers at all. Instead, 
they regard the owner of an RFID tag (which is usually not the user carrying the tag) as 
trusted. For instance, if a user carries a subway ticket which might be abused for unwanted 
recognition and tracking, the user needs to trust the transport company which is the owner 
of the RFID tag on the ticket. This is not wanted. The tag bearer needs explicit consideration 
in the RFID architecture. 
Some solution requirements like sustainability are not considered adequately. 
The main research topics in the area of RFID in the past years have concerned mainly 
security, privacy, and resource consumption requirements. Other requirements like 
sustainability and scope have hardly been examined. However, they have immense 
significance for the quality of RFID systems. RFID systems that adhere to all the 
requirements stated in subchapter 1.3 are required. 
3.2 Limitations in patching the current architecture 
The question that arises is to what extent the existing architecture and methods can be 
improved to address all the deficiencies and to meet all quality requirements. Detailed 
analyses show some contradictory features. Using an example, it is shown in the following 
that just extending the current architecture does not lead to satisfactory solutions. The aim is 
to prove that a completely new concept, i.e. a “clean-slate approach”, is required to address 
all the issues. 
There is a conflict between systems of inter-organizational scope and the protection of 
privacy. This example shows the limitation of patching the current architecture. The trade-
off between the two requirements is explained in the following. 
As already stated, regular changes of the RFID tag identifiers are a requirement for privacy 
protection. Using regular identifier changes, location privacy can be provided. The idea is 
that the current tag identifier does not provide any information regarding the tagged item 
and that due to the regular identifier changes it is no longer possible to use the identifier for 
unwanted recognition and tracking. 
However, this method poses a restriction for inter-organizational systems. Only the 
organization administrating the tag can also identify it because it keeps track of the 
identifier changes in a backend database. Only this organization can link the current tag 
identifier to associated data. For every other organization trying to read the tag and wanting 
to obtain associated tag data, the identifier appears to be just a random number. This is 
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necessary because the reader might also be illegitimate or even an attacker. In consequence, 
the identifier also appears random for legitimate readers, e.g. a subcontractor. A 
subcontractor cannot even find out who is the owner of the tag (see figure 6). The 
subcontractor might work with a huge number of other companies and now does not get the 
information which company is responsible. Requiring contacting all possible owners is not a 
scalable approach and puts too much load on the infrastructure and the backend. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Non-interpretable identifiers in inter-organizational systems 
The information which organization/company is responsible for the tag may not be stored 
on the tag and be provided to the reader since that data can be misused for recognition and 
tracking purposes (at least by considering constellations). Consequently, a regular change of 
tag identifiers helps protecting privacy but causes problems in inter-organizational RFID 
systems. This means that the privacy requirement and the scope requirement run into 
conflict. 
Theoretically, this conflict is solvable [Henrici, D. (2008)]. One possible solution to the 
problem can be provided by the use of pseudonymization infrastructures. They are 
employed for example in anonymous remailers and operate on the shared secret principle. 
In practice, such solutions solve one problem but bring new problems in other areas. For 
instance, the mentioned pseudonymization infrastructures solve the conflict between 
privacy and scope but require a lot of resources, lead to low performance, have scalability 
issues and are costly to implement. 
The described conflict between privacy and scope and the possible architecture extension by 
using pseudonymous infrastructures is just a single example. There are many issues like the 
described deficiencies that need to be addressed in practice. However, the many efforts 
made to improve and extend the existing architecture do not seem to be able to provide 
adequate solutions that can fulfill all quality requirements. 
4. Creating a new RFID system architecture 
Subchapter 3 showed that there are many deficiencies in the current RFID architecture that 
need to be addressed. However, the example in the previous section showed that it will not 
be possible to ever meet all specified requirements in a satisfactory manner only with the 
use of incremental improvements. The trade-off points between some of the quality 
attributes require lying out a fundamentally new direction. The goal of this subchapter is to 
provide some considerations on how such a new, “clean-slate” architecture might be created 
and how it could look like. 
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4.1 Starting points 
The toughest problem in the current architecture is probably the conflict between providing 
location privacy and creating inter-organizational RFID systems. This conflict was described 
in subchapter 3.2. 
Data security demands tag identifiers that appear random. However, random identifiers do 
not provide information regarding the tag owner. But this would be required in inter-
organizational systems. Location privacy requires a periodic change of the tag identifiers. 
This leads to high infrastructure load and affects the scalability of the system negatively. 
Even if the issues can be solved in some way, this comes at high costs. 
Does this mean that security and privacy are incompatible with the economic interests and the 
technical needs? It seems so, a least when the current architecture is considered. The only 
possible way out seems to be the creation of a redesigned architecture based on new concepts. 
One starting point can be found by closer consideration of the nature of privacy. When do 
people consider their privacy protected and when not? Answering this question is not easy. 
The fulfillment of their privacy expectations is of great importance to people. Meeting these 
expectations requires a certain degree of privacy protection. Yet, the expectations and the 
resulting requirements are not explicitly definable. They are context-sensitive and person-
specific. This makes the modeling of privacy requirements and their technical realization a 
difficult task. 
However, there are ways to solve the conflict between privacy protection and scalability: 
Humans need no total privacy protection. They are social beings and are used to give away 
some private information under certain circumstances. It is only important to them that their 
expectations regarding privacy protection are fulfilled. 
Another starting point is that not all of the privacy requirements need to be addressed by 
technical means. The identification and sanction of a violation is often easier to implement 
and fully sufficient in some cases. Moreover, incentive systems can be applied. If the effort 
for a successful attack is higher than the expected gain for the attacker, the attacker will not 
perform an attack. This means, if there is no incentive for an attack, it is no longer an 
interesting option for the attacker. Vice versa, there is a stimulus to behave system-conform, 
if there is some kind of reward for such behavior. 
Thus, there are also non-technical ways to implement privacy protection, e.g. via legislative 
or economic means. Under consideration of this knowledge it is possible to define a system 
architecture that fulfills the quality requirements on RFID better than the existing one. 
Please note that this does not mean that technical protection schemes are not necessary. 
Instead, they are essential. Legislation alone does not provide adequate protection. For 
instance, sending unsolicited email is prohibited. Nevertheless, mailboxes are full of such 
email. The reason is that there are no effective technical safeguards. The possibility to 
sanction misbehavior is missing, too. It is thus very important that not only a kind of 
“pseudo security” is provided but that the sum of technical, legislative, economic and social 
means for providing protection deliver an effective solution. 
4.2 New concepts 
This subchapter provides some new concepts and outlines a new RFID architecture. Some of 
the concepts can also be used in other auto-id systems like optical barcode systems. 
Infrastructure sharing 
One of the deficiencies stated in subchapter 3.1 is the lack of explicit possibilities for 
infrastructure sharing in the current architecture. Each company or organization needs to 
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implement its own infrastructure of readers. Of course, companies can exchange data 
regarding read events, but such a data exchange needs to be implemented explicitly. It often 
takes place on the application layer and is costly to realize. 
Creating a generic mechanism of infrastructure sharing is fairly simple and straight-
forward. First, each RFID tag needs to have an owner that shall be notified regarding the 
whereabouts of the tag. Second, there needs to be a policy that defines that each well-
behaving reading party must contact the tag owner when a tag is read using one of the 
party’s readers. This way, the tag owner gets a notification each time a tag is read. If the 
notification also includes additional information like the location of the reader, there is no 
difference any more whether an RFID reader is operated by the tag owner itself or by 
somebody else: The tag owner gets a read event each time a tag is queried. 
This mechanism is very powerful. It allows companies to track items, e.g. in logistics, 
without requiring to define special interfaces for data exchange with each subcontractor and 
without operating a dense network of readers. 
A tag only needs to store two pieces of information: One that enables the reading party to 
send a message to the tag owner (a kind of address of the tag owner). Another one is 
required to identify the tag uniquely. Both pieces of information together can form the tag 
identifier. If no other information is stored on the tags, the reading party has a strong 
incentive to contact the tag owner, perform the notification and request additional 
information regarding the tag. This is an example where a policy is enforced by an incentive. 
Note that the Object Name Service (ONS) [EPCglobal (2008)] already defines a mechanism 
that could be used for notification purposes: Using the ONS, the reading party can contact 
the tag owner and get links to additional information regarding the read tag. This 
mechanism just needs to be adapted so that the ONS query contains information regarding 
the reading party. 
An infrastructure sharing mechanism is highly desirable for getting the optimal results with 
a given amount of infrastructure hardware. It also saves costs. But if implemented as 
described, it also has a number of disadvantages: It puts a high load on the network 
infrastructure if each tag query results in a notification to the respective tag owner. It also 
seems bad for privacy at first sight as it makes independently operated readers to a 
powerful tracking device. At second sight, it only highlights a problem that is already 
present. If readers become networked, the tracking capability gets more powerful. But in the 
scenario presented here, there is also a big opportunity for privacy protection: We “just” 
need to solve the privacy problem once for the stated infrastructure sharing mechanism, and 
we get a generic solution for all users and all applications. 
Tag bearers become a part of the RFID architecture 
One further problem that was stated in the list of deficiencies of the current architecture is 
the non-consideration of people carrying RFID tags. A tag bearer is not considered in the 
architecture and does not have the freedom to decide when tags are read and what tag 
information is visible and to whom. 
To solve this problem, the tag bearers need to be considered explicitly in the RFID 
architecture. Only this way, they get the ability to protect their privacy effectively. Figure 7 
shows the integration of tag bearers into the architecture. 
The procedure of reading a tag is as follows: The reading party, i.e. the party operating the 
reader, queries an RFID tag and obtains the tag identifier. Instead of the RFID tag, an optical 
barcode could be used, too. If the identifier does not provide valuable information to the 
reading party (which we presume), the reading party has to notify the tag bearer of the read 
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event and request additional information regarding the read tag. The tag bearer can now 
decide whether to proceed or to notify the reading party that no data is provided for privacy 
reasons. In case that the tag bearer decides that the request for data is allowed, he/she 
forwards the request to the tag owner. The tag owner can decide whether to abort or to 
provide the requested data regarding the tag. Thus, if both, tag bearer and tag owner, agree, 
the reading party obtains the information required to identify an item as well as the 
requested additional item information. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Reader, tag bearer and tag owner as separate entities 
The presented procedure is a straight-forward extension to the mechanism described in the 
infrastructure sharing paragraph. But it results in a number of new issues that need to be 
addressed. 
Of course, tag bearer and tag owners cannot decide manually whether to allow tag 
identification or not. This would be a burden to the users. Instead, they require the ability to 
define policies so that most of the requests can be answered automatically. 
Another issue is anonymity. For example, it should be possible for a customer to read the 
price of a product in a supermarket with his/her mobile phone without revealing his/her 
identity. This requires a neutral third party in the communication path between the reading 
party and the tag bearer. Another requirement is the support of changing tag identifiers for 
the protection of location privacy. 
Reducing load while providing location privacy 
There are still a lot of issues to be addressed. One major problem is the conflict between the 
provision of location privacy using identifier changes and the scalability requirements of 
inter-organizational systems. Furthermore, the infrastructure sharing mechanism introduced 
at the beginning of this subchapter puts a high load on the infrastructure by read 
notifications. Even more load would be caused by frequent identifier changes. 
To address all the open issues, a new architecture is required. It needs to provide location 
privacy and needs to reduce the load on the infrastructure significantly. Some starting 
points were discussed in subchapter 4.2. Additionally, we require effective mechanisms for 
caching and delegation. 
On this account, the ID-Zone Architecture [Henrici, D. (2008)] was created. It does no longer 
use the barcode-system principle but can be applied for different kinds of auto-id systems, 
including RFID and barcode systems. The approach is compatible with existing backend 
solutions. 
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The basic idea of the ID-Zone Architecture is the creation of zones. The physical space is 
separated into disjoint (non-overlapping) zones. An example is shown in figure 8. Each zone 
matches an administrative competency, e.g. a shop or a library. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Example for the zone concept 
As long as an object with an RFID tag is within a zone, the tag identifier remains constant 
(there are some optional exceptions for preventing industrial espionage that are not 
discussed here). On the one hand, this approach considerably reduces the load on the 
infrastructure caused by identifier changes. On the other hand, the privacy protection is 
slightly restricted. But since recognition within an administrative zone is often desired and 
can also be realized via other methods (e.g. by personnel, video cameras), this is not a 
relevant limitation in practice. 
If a tagged object leaves a zone, the tag on the object has to identify itself with another, new 
identifier in the new zone so that it is not possible for an outsider to recognize that it is the 
same tag, i.e. the same object. This is important for privacy protection since otherwise a 
movement profile could be created if different zones cooperate. If a tag returns to a previous 
zone, i.e. a zone where it already was some time before, it is for the same reason necessary to 
use a new identifier, different to the former one used previously in that zone. This behavior 
is shown in an example in figure 9: At first, a tag has the identifier “P123:456” and enters 
another zone. If it returns, it gets the identifier “P123:963”. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Layering and example for the ID-Zone Architecture 
This approach solves the conflict between privacy protection and scalability. The “logical 
zones” (refer to figure 9) provide anonymity for tag bearers. However, a number of new 
questions arise: How does a tag know from a reliable source in which zone it is? When 
(before leaving a zone, on entering a zone, on the first read in the new zone, etc.) and how 
should the change of the identifier take place? 
The answer to these questions is already depicted in figure 8 but an explanation goes 
beyond the scope of this text. The implementation of the concepts of the ID-Zone 
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Architecture with appropriate efficient RFID protocols is also out of scope. More 
information is provided in [Henrici, D. (2008)] for the interested reader. 
The message should be clear now: With new concepts and architectural changes, there are 
powerful possibilities for addressing the challenges stated in subchapters 1.1 and 1.3. In 
contrast, the current architecture is at its limits and incremental improvements are no longer 
sufficient. 
5. Summary and research directions 
The RFID technology will be an inevitable part of our everyday life in the foreseeable future. 
It offers various application spectrums that raise productivity, increase comfort, and open 
new markets. An important aspect is the consideration of the user requirements since an 
abandonment of the technology will not be possible for the individual. Foods, clothes, 
books, and many other goods will be tagged and identified with RFID tags. Therefore, 
designing concepts and methods that ensure security and privacy protection for systems of 
global scope is one of the main research goals in the field of RFID. 
The challenge is great since not only technical and economical aspects have to be considered 
but also ethical and social ones. There need to be technical safeguards and the possibility of 
informational self-determination for the users. Nevertheless, the solutions have to be cheap 
and easy to realize. Moreover, a range of quality requirements like reliability, scalability, 
flexibility, openness, and sustainability have to be considered. 
Besides security and privacy, there are many more research challenges. Systems need to 
support inter-organizational business processes. Also, the integration of people carrying the 
RFID tags (“tag bearers”) into the system is important for providing information self-
determination. In contrast, current solutions consider only the interests of the RFID tag 
owner (i.e. supermarkets, libraries, employers, countries, etc.). Yet, the users concerned with 
privacy and data protection problems are the ones who carry the tags (buyers, library users, 
employees, citizens, etc.). Another sophisticated problem is the provision of location 
privacy, i.e. protect people from unwanted recognition and tracking. 
The goal of this book chapter was to advise the reader to the different challenges in the 
sphere of RFID systems and to point out the need of a new system architecture as a solution 
to the various functional and qualitative requirements. 
New concepts help to address the issues. Examples are infrastructure sharing and the 
consideration of tag bearers as part of the RFID architecture. The sketched ID-Zone 
Architecture provides ideas on how to even resolve conflicts that seem unsolvable with the 
current architecture. 
The presented concepts and the proposed architecture are surely no universal remedy, but 
they appear promising. In contrast, the current architecture appears to be at its limits so that 
incremental improvements will not be able to meet all the practical requirements. 
The various challenges can only be addressed by heading into new directions. One of the 
new directions is the consideration of technical security measures in the economical, 
legislative, and social context. Many existing proposals concentrate on technical security 
measures and neglect the non-technical constraints and possibilities. Yet, non-technical 
measures can support the technical security mechanisms. Researchers need to start to 
explore the possibilities and limitations that new concepts and new architectures provide. 
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